I mentioned the recession (actually, in the case of the U.S. there were twin recessions that followed in close proximity) in noting:

The Bank of England, much like the U.S. Federal Reserve, entered a situation in which they had to, as Meltzer put it, "at last respond to the public's complaints about inflation." As a result, both Britain and the U.S. experienced a significant recession.

As for monetary policy, it certainly has evolved since the late 1970s and early 1980s. Aside from Milton Friedman's proposition that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, one has witnessed the development of the Taylor Rule, among other changes to help guide central bankers.

The situations to which central banks must respond can lead to difficult tradeoffs in which there are no easy choices. Although I do not have access to the transcripts of the Bank of England's monetary policy deliberations, one can find the reality of tradeoffs, particularly during the period in question, in the U.S. Federal Reserve's transcripts.

For example, during the April 22, 1980 meeting of its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which establishes monetary policy, the Federal Reserve found itself confronted by visible evidence of a slowing economy and rising inflation. Then Fed Chairman Paul Volcker's commentary highlighted the dilemma. Relevant exerpts follow:

People believe what they want to believe. If they saw the inflation rate coming down, they would be more persuaded... The big change we've had--though we've had a lot of changes since the last meeting--is that we certainly have some evidence of an economic decline that we didn't have before... I do think that in all probability we re going to have a recession...

But when attitudes fluctuate as rapidly as they have, it's a little premature to say attitudes couldn't relapse the other way. And looking at a longer-term perspective, there's no question in my mind that in considerable part inflation is what got us into this dilemma...

I don't think we're in a situation where there's any coure of action that is risk-free or even in some sense a "winning" course of action because there's a lot to be lost by a resurgence in inflationary expectations and there's a lot to be lost by accelerating the recession; and I'm not sure that there's any real room between those two contingencies... All I'm saying is that I don't think there's any perfect answer or any right answer that goes between them.

Practice is much messier and far more uncertain than theory. As Paul Volcker attributed the evolving economic situation "in considerable part" to inflation, the Fed chose to maintain its focus on bringing down the inflation rate even as the economy softened. During the 1970s, the Fed made the other choice and in the process laid the foundation for the major stagflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Given the economic environment, I have little doubt that the Bank of England faced a similar dilemma. Given the experience of the 1970s in which a 'fight the recession now, take on inflation later' approach failed to curb inflation, it is not surprising that the Bank of England also placed its emphasis on reducing inflation.

Finally, a quick note on supply-side policies: as such policies seek to push the supply curve to the right, they provide a disinflationary impact; Policies aimed at stimulating demand can have an inflationary impact as they push the demand curve to the right.

Originally Posted by donsutherland1 I mentioned the recession

As for monetary policy, it certainly has evolved since the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Although I do not have access to the transcripts of the Bank of England's monetary policy deliberations

Given the experience of the 1970s in which a 'fight the recession now, take on inflation later' approach failed to curb inflation, it is not surprising that the Bank of England also placed its emphasis on reducing inflation.

Originally Posted by Scucca The miners were attacked as part of a revenge mission,...

Originally Posted by aegyptos Nonsense and marxist propaganda.

The pits were closed and the miners let go because they economically inefficient, to you one of your favorite words.

Originally Posted by Scucca The miners were hated for their part in the downfall of Tory regime.

Originally Posted by aegyptos Just envy on the part of Scargill and his mob of cretins.

Originally Posted by Scucca Can't you even try to keep to serious comment? You don't know our history. The miners were hated for their part in the downfall of Tory regime. That profitable mines were closed is just a factual comment. You clearly know nothing about this subject, so I'd appreciate if you trolled elsewhere. Cheers!

Originally Posted by mikhail How where they profitable?

In the fiscal year ended March 31, 1984 (FY 1983) in which the coal miners strike was launched by Arthur Scargill, the mines lost $1.164 billion (about $873 million in losses were incurred prior to the coal strike).

Source: Source: "British Coal Industry Announces Huge Loss," The New York Times, July 27, 1984.

The above loss was dramatically larger than the $180 million loss in FY 1982 and $102 million loss in FY 1981 despite closures of unprofitable pits.

Source of FY 1981 and FY 1982 losses: Barnaby J. Federlondon, "Mrs. Thatcher Tests The Miners," The New York Times, August 28, 1983.

All said, the coal mines were highly unprofitable. Worse, despite the closure of the worst-performing pits, the sea of red ink was swelling. Given the magnitude of the losses and changes in the world coal production industry, Britain was faced with the bleak position of a potentially permanent lack of competitiveness in coal mining, barring the closure of an overwhelming majority of its pits that had arguably become economically unsalvageable. So long as huge subsidies were flowing to the coal industry (more than £1 billion per year according to Margaret Thatcher's memoirs), Britain was imperiling its future by directing scarce resources to an industry that was moribund, as there were sizable opportunity costs incurred from the diversion of these resources from more productive, growth-oriented industries.

Originally Posted by donsutherland1 All said, the coal mines were highly unprofitable. Worse, despite the closure of the worst-performing pits

Britain was faced with the bleak position of a potentially permanent lack of competitiveness in coal mining, barring the closure of an overwhelming majority of its pits that had become economically unsalvageable.