Iriemon,

First, it should be noted that my opening post should not be viewed as an endorsement of President Musharraf's decision. Clearly, my strong preference is biased toward democratic rule and a robust separation of powers.

Nonetheless, as a pragmatic Realist, I recognize that a foreign policy that is based on the pursuit of the national interest and constrained by balance of power considerations, etc. often requires a country to put pragmatic realities ahead of idealistic preferences. In my opening post I merely express my opinion as to how the U.S. should respond to the situation in Pakistan.

Second, the U.S. should be aware of the real limits that exist on what can be achieved and the contingencies that could arise from various courses of action so as to reasonably assess the actual latitude it might have to influence events. In making such an assessment, U.S. foreign policymakers should consider that the emergency declaration is rather limited in scope and specifically targeted at the judiciary. Pakistan's Parliament will continue to function as before. So will its provincial governments. Furthermore, Pakistan's Attorney General announced a little earlier today that the elections previously scheduled for January will not be delayed. So aside from the limited nature of the emergency order, there remain encouraging indications that Pakistan's longer-term transition toward democracy will continue.

Third, the point you raise about a forceful U.S. message is not necessarily incompatible with my opening post. Such views can be raised in private settings. Behind-the-scenes, there will be opportunities for U.S. diplomats to raise constructive concerns with their counterparts from Pakistan.

Finally, through strong public criticism and threats concerning military cooperation and foreign aid reductions, the U.S. might well be able to force President Musharraf to back down under intense pressure. However, aside from the risk of a rupture in the crucial U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship, such a development could leave Pakistan's government gravely weakened. I

f that happens, prospects for extremist elements to gain power could be greatly facilitated. Ironically, in that situation, even as U.S. policies would have brought an end to the emergency decree, those policies would have given pro-Taliban elements a basis to argue that the U.S. is 'interfering' in Pakistan's domestic affairs. Such groups, often fundamentally undemocratic, have never been shy about exploiting events for their own propaganda purposes. In any case, should the U.S. force President Musharraf to reverse his order and should Pakistan's government disintegrate or collapse afterward on account of its having been gravely weakened, the costs associated with enduring strategic losses would greatly outweigh any temporary tactical gains that the U.S. might have achieved from a tough public posture.