The issue of framing a proper U.S. foreign policy response to President Pervez Musharraf’s recent declaration of a state of emergency in Pakistan presents a classic example of the need for U.S. foreign policy to emphasize pragmatism over idealism in pursuit of the national interest. To be sure, Musharraf’s move is anti-democratic, even as it is targeted at the Judiciary whom the President accused of “overstepping the limits of judicial authority” and assuming “executive and legislative functions.”
As the U.S. ponders its foreign policy choices, it should bear in mind that Pakistan’s emergency is limited. It does not seek to impose a totalitarian dictatorship. It targets the judiciary, but does not inhibit Parliament’s capacity to function. Furthermore, it is not intended to terminate Pakistan’s transition to democracy. In his national address, Musharraf explained:
I should mention here, in this [order]
, there would be no change in government. Prime Minister, governors, chief ministers, all would remain at their portfolios. All the assemblies would continue, meaning Senate, national Assembly, provincial assemblies, all these would continue to run in their place as were running. The same process would continue… In my view, this is the easiest way to put Pakistan back on track as soon as possible and to pursue continuity in the way we were moving forward with regard to economic developmental aspect and complete the last transition phase of the democratic process.
Behind-the-scenes, there will be opportunities for U.S. diplomats to raise constructive concerns with their counterparts from Pakistan. Those discussions should be held in private. Clearly, this approach will not satisfy those who embrace a more idealistic approach to foreign policy. They will likely clamor for a maximum of public pressure, reduced military cooperation with Pakistan’s armed forces and perhaps significant reductions in U.S. assistance to Pakistan. A few might even argue for the U.S. lead the charge on seeking economic sanctions against Pakistan.
Pursuing such measures would be a potentially grave mistake. Pakistan is confronted by a rising pro-Taliban opposition. Should such elements gain power, a nuclear-armed state could become a new haven for pro-Taliban and even Al Qaeda elements. Such a development could threaten to erase gains made in Afghanistan, destabilize south Asia (particularly the disputed Kashmir region, but also portions of India), and any effort at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or components could collapse. It could also further Iranian geopolitical gains. Already, Iran’s
Tehran Times recommended, “Musharraf should rethink about his cooperation with the United States on its so-called war on terror, which is the major source of unrest in the northwest of Pakistan and the increase of religious extremism in the country.”
In the weeks leading up to the President’s move, kidnappings of soldiers and indiscriminate killings had increased markedly in northwestern sections of Pakistan. Moreover, according to Musharraf’s emergency decree, Pakistan’s judiciary had ordered the release of “some hardcore militants, extremists, terrorists and suicide bombers” who were still being investigated and some of those individuals “so released” were later “involved in heinous terrorist activities, resulting in loss of human life and property.”
President Musharraf explained his rationale for temporarily suspending Pakistan’s constitution. He declared:
…terrorism and extremism in my view have reached new heights. At this time suicide attacks are taking place all over Pakistan. What happened in Karachi, after that in Rawalpindi, in Sargodha, their intensity has increased all over Pakistan. Extremists are roaming freely in the country without any fear of law-enforcement agencies… But the regrettable thing is that extremism has spread into Islamabad, the heart of Pakistan, the capital of Pakistan and is a source of grave concern for the people.
These extremists are taking the writ of government into their hands and want to run a government within a government. And the worst thing is that they are trying to impose their extremist, obsolete religious ideas, an outdated view about Islam on moderate people through force. And in my view they are posing a direct challenge to Pakistan’s integrity. This is a very serious situation of terrorism and extremism.
Considering the circumstances that led to Musharraf’s emergency decree, Iranian aspirations for a rupture in bilateral U.S.-Pakistan relations, and the implications of pro-Taliban forces gaining control over Pakistan, the U.S. should be careful to minimize steps that could undermine President Musharraf's rule during this difficult period. In my opinion, should President Musharraf ever seek additional assistance, the U.S. should be prepared to provide covert assistance and arms to thwart the ability of violent pro-Taliban elements from gaining control of Pakistan.
In September, General Anthony Zinni wrote an insightful piece on the importance of maintaining American backing for Pakistan’s embattled President. Zinni
wrote:
When Musharraf took over as head of the Pakistani military in 1998, I visited him for several days in Islamabad. I had learned to greatly respect the professionalism of the Pakistani military when I saw their gallantry firsthand during my service in Somalia; as CENTCOM commander, I came to appreciate the need for a strong military-to-military relationship to help ensure stability in the volatile region of South Asia.
Musharraf, like his predecessors, wanted to preserve the thin thread of the U.S.-Pakistani military relationship, even if it was based only on our personal friendship. This view wasn't shared by all of Musharraf's commanders or Pakistan's political leaders, but we both thought it was important that the connection -- the only real, useful link between our governments -- be closely maintained. Our bond was not entirely popular on the U.S. side either. I was allowed to maintain it, but only over many objections and reservations.
But when Musharraf took control of the government in a 1999 coup, I was told to break off all ties with him. He called me right after he assumed power to explain the events that had led to the takeover and to underscore his determination to bring "democracy in substance and not just in form."
Allies are supposed to be partners, not paragons. We will find ourselves in trouble if we insist that our allies do everything we ask, measure up totally to our concepts of how their societies should function and make no demands of us. Look at the NATO forces in Afghanistan, just across the border from Pakistan; are all of those troops, from 37 countries, fighting with the same commitment as Pakistan's forces are? Has U.S. support for the Pakistani military truly been enough to help it operate in the extremely difficult border environment where U.S. politicians urge it to confront al-Qaeda? Has America's relationship with Pakistan yielded sufficient benefits to persuade the skeptical Pakistani public to support mutual efforts to counter Islamic extremists?
All of us could have been smarter in handling the conflict with Osama bin Laden and his ilk from the start, and we need to continuously review and improve our efforts. I recently visited Pakistan again and had an opportunity to discuss the threat with Musharraf. I was impressed with his focus on improving border-control methods, training border-security forces and improving border-security cooperation with Afghanistan. It was clear that he is committed to doing his part to control a notoriously leaky frontier. It was also clear that the United States needs to offer far more support and coordination to let Pakistan and Afghanistan make this all work.
Both nations should avoid attacking each other and learn to appreciate the efforts and sacrifices that each has made in the struggle against their common foe. Careless, irresponsible statements can damage fragile alliances and erode cooperation and trust. They serve only to encourage our mutual enemies in al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who will use them for their own gain. Pakistan and Afghanistan must embark upon a more constructive dialogue. And I could say something similar about the U.S. debate about Pakistan. Unless we do better, we will continue to lose allies as a result of reckless, alienating comments that amount to short-term domestic political posturing and hurt U.S. security interests in the long run.
In short, as Pakistan sorts out its internal difficulties, the U.S. could work with President Musharraf to foster and deepen a dialogue with some of his more moderate opponents e.g., former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, aimed at a long-term strategy of transitioning Pakistan into a parliamentary democracy. It could encourage Pakistan’s President to minimize the duration of the emergency. As part of the package, the U.S. could increase foreign assistance to help alleviate some of the more difficult economic challenges confronting Pakistan in order to mitigate the extremists’ ability to appeal to the broader population. The U.S. could also work behind-the-scenes with President Musharraf to help Pakistan build effective democratic institutions so that when elections are held, perhaps next year or possibly even earlier (according to Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, no official decision to suspend the elections has been made at this time), Pakistan would possess the capacity to sustain its democratic governance once democracy is restored.
Unfortunately, the U.S. has sometimes lacked a strategic approach to foreign policy. Its foreign policy has occasionally been reactive rather than proactive. In the long-run, that reduces prospects for realizing opportunities to peacefully influence the course of events. That danger would be especially acute should the U.S. radically alter its relationship with Pakistan on account of appeals to idealism.