Fresh from witnessing Israel's prisoner release agreement with Hezbollah, Hamas appears poised to raise its own demands for Cpl. Shalit's release.

Today, The Jerusalem Post reported:

Hamas on Monday said it was emboldened by Israel's decision to trade Samir Kuntar for Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev.

Gaza strongman Mahmoud Zahar, speaking to the independent Al-Quds radio station, said Hamas would take advantage of this decision "to release people Israel accused of having blood on their hands like Samir Kuntar. We have to take advantage of this to release our prisoners."

In my opinion, the swap is a terrible decision given the highly visible perceptions of weakness it creates (something that Hezbollah is already broadcasting widely via Al-Manar TV), the reality that prisoners who engaged in cold-blooded murder are covered, and the precedent it establishes.

A similar evolution toward caving to Hamas' demands may well be underway. First, I continue to believe that Israel should not have consented to a ceasefire with Hamas unless Cpl. Shalit were released in exchange for the ceasefire. The ceasefire offered a strong bargaining chip that Prime Minister Olmert gave away. That development indicated to Hamas that Israel is pliable and, as I noted in another thread on the topic, was likely to encourage Hamas to raise its "asking price" for Cpl. Shalit's release. Second, Israel's failure to respond to recent repeated violations of the ceasefire with Hamas and its prisoner swap agreement with Hezbollah have now strengthened such perceptions of weakness among Hamas' leadership.

I remain worried that Prime Minister Olmert will ultimately largely capitulate to Hamas' demands leading Israel to release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, including those with blood on their hands. The fact that Prime Minister Olmert's government entered into and approved the agreement with the Hezbollah terrorist organization in spite of Mossad and Shin Bet opposition is particularly troubling. At a minimum, it hints that political expediency and not national security considerations drove the decisionmaking. It raises anew the prospect that Prime Minister Olmert's decisionmaking is perhaps increasingly being influenced by his battle for political survival. If so, the Kadima primary could not come soon enough.