Debate Politics Forums - View Single Post - Bush calls for the end of Israeli 'occupation' of Arab Lands

donsutherland1 · 01-10-08, 11:00 PM

In my opinion, President Bush's reference to Israeli "occupation" was not helpful. It is historically inaccurate, it could prejudice negotiations, and its expression in Jerusalem is not respectful to the President's hosts.

Israel did not conquer the West Bank in a bid for more territory. In the 1967 War that was launched to break Egypt's illegal blockade of Israel in the international waters of the Strait of Tiran--after great Israeli restraint and a lack of effective leadership on the international front--Jordan launched an attack on Israel, even as Israel urged Jordan to stay out of the war. Only after Jordan began seizing territory in Jerusalem did Israel commence military operations against Jordan. It was in consequence of that act of self-defence that Israel gained control of the West Bank.

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's speech before the UN Security Council on June 6, 1967 summed up the situation as it had evolved:

An army, greater than any force ever assembled it, history in Sinai, had massed against Israel's southern frontier. Egypt had dismissed the United Nations forces which symbolized the international interest in the maintenance of peace in our region. Nasser had provocatively brought five infantry divisions and two armored divisions up to our very gates; 80,000 men and 900 tanks were poised to move.

A special striking force, comprising an armored division with at least 200 tanks, was concentrated against Eflat at the Negev's southern tip. Here was a clear design to cut the southern Negev off from the main body of our State. For Egypt had openly proclaimed that Eflat did not form part of Israel and had predicted that Israel itself would soon expire. The proclamation was empty; the prediction now lies in ruin. While the main brunt of the hostile threat was focussed on the southern front, an alarming plan of encirclement was under way. With Egypt's initiative and guidance, Israel was already being strangled in its maritime approaches to the whole eastern half of the world. For sixteen years, Israel had been illicitly denied passage in the Suez Canal, despite the Security Council's decision of 1 September 1951 [resolution 95 (1951)]. And now the creative enterprise of ten patient years which had opened an international route across the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba had been suddenly and arbitrarily choked. Israel was and is breathing with only a single lung.

Jordan had been intimidated, against its better interest, into joining a defense pact. It is not a defense pact at all: it is an aggressive pact, of which I saw the consequences with my own eyes yesterday in the shells falling upon institutions of health and culture in the City of Jerusalem. Every house and street in Jerusalem now came into the range of fire as a result of Jordan's adherence to this pact; so also did the crowded and pathetically narrow coastal strip in which so much of Israel's life and population is concentrated.

Iraqi troops reinforced Jordanian units in area immediately facing vital and vulnerable Israel communication centers. Expeditionary forces from Algeria and Kuwait had reached Egyptian territory. Nearly all the Egyptian forces which had been attempting the conquest of the Yemen had been transferred to the coming assault upon Israel. Syrian units, including artillery, overlooked the Israel villages in the Jordan Valley. Terrorist troops came regularly into our territory to kill, plunder and set off explosions; the most recent occasion was five days ago.

In short, there was peril for Israel wherever it looked. Its manpower had been hastily mobilized. Its economy and commerce were beating with feeble pulses. Its streets were dark and empty. There was an apocalyptic air of approaching peril. And Israel faced this danger alone.

Following the 1956 war, Israel withdrew fully from territories it captured. The international community had pledged that Egypt's interference with the passage of shipping through the Strait of Tiran would not be repeated. A UN observer force was put in place. Yet, in May 1967, the international community refused to uphold its commitments when Egypt again blockaded those international waters. The UN withdrew its observer force when Egypt demanded such a move. Israel had withdrawn and the promises of the international community proved worthless.

Israel would be prudent to retain the lands it captured in response to the 1967 Arab aggression as bargaining leverage. To throw away its gains, which were achieved at significant sacrifice, would be reckless.

Peace will require compromise on all sides, including border adjustments. Israel recognizes this, and I fully expect that Israel will give the greatest consideration to any reasonable peace proposal that has the possibility of meeting its core needs. At the same time, the Palestinians will also need to compromise. They cannot reasonably expect that Israel should capitulate to their maximum demands. Moreover, their demand that Israel should be required to admit Palestinian refugees and their descendants within its own borders is a non-starter. Such a demand would only threaten Israel's viability as a Jewish state, a founding purpose of Israel's re-establishment and the United Nations' original intent in designing its partition plan. In short, the terms of peace cannot ever require the demise of another state. The refugee demand would do just that by transforming Israel into a Jewish minority state (in effect, another Arab state).

In the end, President Bush's unfortunate language has the potential to damage the peace process, not facilitate it. It can only bolster Palestinian intransigence by promoting the perception that Israel is "occupying" Palestinian land. The proper perspective is that Israel and the Palestinians would be negotiating over what land would flow to the Palestinians in exchange for reciprocal Palestinian commitments. Before that happens, the status of the land that would be subject to the negotiations should not be prejudiced.

01-10-08, 11:00 PM	#2 (permalink)
donsutherland1 Moderator Mod team member Join Date: Oct 2007 Last Online: Today 07:44 AM Location: New York Posts: 2,466 Thanks: 814 Thanked 1,571 Times in 877 Posts Lean: Centrist Gender: Awards:	Re: Bush calls for the end of Israeli 'occupation' of Arab Lands In my opinion, President Bush's reference to Israeli "occupation" was not helpful. It is historically inaccurate, it could prejudice negotiations, and its expression in Jerusalem is not respectful to the President's hosts. Israel did not conquer the West Bank in a bid for more territory. In the 1967 War that was launched to break Egypt's illegal blockade of Israel in the international waters of the Strait of Tiran--after great Israeli restraint and a lack of effective leadership on the international front--Jordan launched an attack on Israel, even as Israel urged Jordan to stay out of the war. Only after Jordan began seizing territory in Jerusalem did Israel commence military operations against Jordan. It was in consequence of that act of self-defence that Israel gained control of the West Bank. Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's speech before the UN Security Council on June 6, 1967 summed up the situation as it had evolved: An army, greater than any force ever assembled it, history in Sinai, had massed against Israel's southern frontier. Egypt had dismissed the United Nations forces which symbolized the international interest in the maintenance of peace in our region. Nasser had provocatively brought five infantry divisions and two armored divisions up to our very gates; 80,000 men and 900 tanks were poised to move. A special striking force, comprising an armored division with at least 200 tanks, was concentrated against Eflat at the Negev's southern tip. Here was a clear design to cut the southern Negev off from the main body of our State. For Egypt had openly proclaimed that Eflat did not form part of Israel and had predicted that Israel itself would soon expire. The proclamation was empty; the prediction now lies in ruin. While the main brunt of the hostile threat was focussed on the southern front, an alarming plan of encirclement was under way. With Egypt's initiative and guidance, Israel was already being strangled in its maritime approaches to the whole eastern half of the world. For sixteen years, Israel had been illicitly denied passage in the Suez Canal, despite the Security Council's decision of 1 September 1951 [resolution 95 (1951)]. And now the creative enterprise of ten patient years which had opened an international route across the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba had been suddenly and arbitrarily choked. Israel was and is breathing with only a single lung. Jordan had been intimidated, against its better interest, into joining a defense pact. It is not a defense pact at all: it is an aggressive pact, of which I saw the consequences with my own eyes yesterday in the shells falling upon institutions of health and culture in the City of Jerusalem. Every house and street in Jerusalem now came into the range of fire as a result of Jordan's adherence to this pact; so also did the crowded and pathetically narrow coastal strip in which so much of Israel's life and population is concentrated. Iraqi troops reinforced Jordanian units in area immediately facing vital and vulnerable Israel communication centers. Expeditionary forces from Algeria and Kuwait had reached Egyptian territory. Nearly all the Egyptian forces which had been attempting the conquest of the Yemen had been transferred to the coming assault upon Israel. Syrian units, including artillery, overlooked the Israel villages in the Jordan Valley. Terrorist troops came regularly into our territory to kill, plunder and set off explosions; the most recent occasion was five days ago. In short, there was peril for Israel wherever it looked. Its manpower had been hastily mobilized. Its economy and commerce were beating with feeble pulses. Its streets were dark and empty. There was an apocalyptic air of approaching peril. And Israel faced this danger alone. Following the 1956 war, Israel withdrew fully from territories it captured. The international community had pledged that Egypt's interference with the passage of shipping through the Strait of Tiran would not be repeated. A UN observer force was put in place. Yet, in May 1967, the international community refused to uphold its commitments when Egypt again blockaded those international waters. The UN withdrew its observer force when Egypt demanded such a move. Israel had withdrawn and the promises of the international community proved worthless. Israel would be prudent to retain the lands it captured in response to the 1967 Arab aggression as bargaining leverage. To throw away its gains, which were achieved at significant sacrifice, would be reckless. Peace will require compromise on all sides, including border adjustments. Israel recognizes this, and I fully expect that Israel will give the greatest consideration to any reasonable peace proposal that has the possibility of meeting its core needs. At the same time, the Palestinians will also need to compromise. They cannot reasonably expect that Israel should capitulate to their maximum demands. Moreover, their demand that Israel should be required to admit Palestinian refugees and their descendants within its own borders is a non-starter. Such a demand would only threaten Israel's viability as a Jewish state, a founding purpose of Israel's re-establishment and the United Nations' original intent in designing its partition plan. In short, the terms of peace cannot ever require the demise of another state. The refugee demand would do just that by transforming Israel into a Jewish minority state (in effect, another Arab state). In the end, President Bush's unfortunate language has the potential to damage the peace process, not facilitate it. It can only bolster Palestinian intransigence by promoting the perception that Israel is "occupying" Palestinian land. The proper perspective is that Israel and the Palestinians would be negotiating over what land would flow to the Palestinians in exchange for reciprocal Palestinian commitments. Before that happens, the status of the land that would be subject to the negotiations should not be prejudiced.